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BRICS and Latin America: Who's In, Who's Out, and Why It Matters

The emerging markets bloc is reshaping global power—and Latin America is choosing sides.

BRICS Status in Latin America

🇧🇷 BrazilFounding member • 2025 Chair
🇦🇷 ArgentinaWITHDREW (Dec 2023)
🇧🇴 Bolivia / 🇨🇺 CubaPartner status (2024)
🇻🇪 VenezuelaBLOCKED by Brazil veto
🇨🇴 ColombiaJoined NDB (June 2025)

BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—represents the emerging multipolar world order. Its expansion into Latin America reveals the region's geopolitical fractures and possibilities.

Brazil: The Anchor

As the only Latin American founding member, Brazil serves as BRICS' regional anchor. Under Lula, Brazil chairs BRICS in 2025, hosting summits and setting the agenda. Brazilian leadership gives the bloc legitimacy in the hemisphere—and gives Brazil outsized influence in shaping its direction.

Argentina: The Defector

Argentina was invited to join BRICS in 2023. Then Javier Milei won the presidency and immediately withdrew, calling BRICS an "anti-Western" bloc and aligning firmly with Washington. The reversal illustrated how quickly Latin American foreign policy can shift with elections.

Venezuela: Blocked

Venezuela applied for BRICS membership but was blocked—by Brazil. Lula, despite his leftist credentials, vetoed Maduro's application, citing concerns about Venezuelan democracy and the complications it would create with Western partners.

The veto reveals BRICS' limits: it's not simply an anti-Western alliance, but a pragmatic grouping that balances multiple interests.

Colombia: The Bank Route

Colombia under Petro took a middle path: rather than seeking full BRICS membership, it joined the BRICS New Development Bank in June 2025. This provides access to alternative financing without the full political implications of membership.

The move fits Petro's strategy of diversification—building relationships with multiple power centers rather than depending on any single one.

Gran Colombia and BRICS

A unified Gran Colombia could be a significant BRICS player. With $711 billion in GDP, the world's largest oil reserves, and control of the Panama Canal, it would have negotiating power that individual nations lack.

BRICS membership—or partnership with its institutions—could provide alternatives to U.S.-dominated financial systems. A confederation could access credit from the New Development Bank, trade in currencies other than the dollar, and participate in BRICS governance structures.

This isn't about choosing China over the United States. It's about having options—which individual small nations don't have, but a regional bloc would.

Sources

  • • Chatham House, BRICS analysis
  • • Foreign Policy, Latin America coverage
  • • BRICS-Plus Analytics, membership tracking